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The American War for Independence provided opportunities across the British 
Americas for people of African descent to embrace military service as a means of 
enhancing their rights. In Jamaica wartime disagreements between imperial officials 
and the planter elite gave free men of colour an opportunity to lay claim to fairer 
treatment and the rights of subjecthood through military service. By examining a 
series of unique and unprecedented petitions and recruiting proclamations, this article 
reconstructs the creation of the Jamaica Rangers in 1782 and reveals how free men 
challenged the racial hierarchies of the island and coalesced politically a decade 
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The American War for Independence provided opportunities across the British Americas for 
people of African descent to embrace military service as a means of enhancing their rights.1 
When France and Spain entered the conflict, the threat of defeat and in some cases conquest 
by the Franco-American alliance required imperial subjects – and the government that ruled 
them – to deliberate on the status and rights of non-white peoples within the empire who 
might help defend British rule of far-flung colonies. In regions where white Protestants were 
a minority, the British state began to respond to the claims by increasingly salient marginal 
constituencies that their role in the defence of the empire entitled them to just consideration 
and even equal treatment. 
 Documentary evidence from Jamaica – including a series of remarkable recruiting 
advertisements and an illuminating petition penned by free soldiers of colour – allows us to 
reconstruct how the island’s free men of colour expressed their rights as militarily-capable 
subjects and how white officials responded to these claims for recognition with increasing 
sympathy. These sources are unique and comprise the earliest known recruiting 
proclamations aimed specifically at free people of colour in the British Atlantic World.  They 
tell a complicated story of racial hierarchy in Jamaica and point to the ambiguities of such 
hierarchies for free men of colour.  They also allow us to analyse the language of service and 
subjecthood for free people of colour at a critical time in Caribbean history, from both free 
peoples’ and white perspectives. In the very heart of Britain’s plantation complex – where the 
inequalities of empire were devastatingly obvious and unambiguously harsh – came some of 
the most remarkable innovations seen in the revolutionary Atlantic. In Jamaica, British 
officials and a small number of white planters acknowledged the value of black military 
service, establishing an alliance with free people of colour that resulted, in 1782, in the 
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creation of an unprecedented British provincial regiment composed entirely of free people of 
colour. 
 Jamaica was not the only site of radical innovation during the American war; nor did 
the recruitment of free men of colour originate in 1775. The Seven Years’ War had witnessed 
efforts to recruit both enslaved and free men of colour – including from Jamaica (see below) 
– in a period that Maria Alessandra Bollettino has called ‘a moment of experimentation’.2 
Moreover, during the American Revolution, some of the most provocative changes took 
place in St. Lucia – captured from the French in late 1778 – where local commanders such as 
General Edward Mathew could ignore the protests of French plantation owners over the issue 
of black recruitment. Mathew was instrumental in establishing the first permanent black 
regiment in the British West Indies.3 Yet even when compared with contemporaneous 
developments, Jamaica’s innovations may be regarded as unprecedented. The Jamaican case 
differed from that of St. Lucia in two respects: 1. It took place in the context of a British 
island with a representative assembly, and 2. It involved the active recruitment of free men – 
as opposed to the purchase of enslaved men as in St. Lucia. For these reasons, and because of 
the existence of sources that speak directly to the military recruitment of free men, the 
Jamaican case is worthy of examination. In fact, it offers a unique opportunity to understand 
multi-racial dialogue in the British West Indies.4 
 Jamaica’s importance centres on quickly evolving definitions of subjecthood within 
the British empire. Subjecthood took on profound significance as Britons found themselves at 
the centre of a vast and multi-ethnic territorial empire after 1763. As white subjects attempted 
to circumscribe the limits of Britishness, the new peoples of the empire responded by 
deploying more expansive definitions of subjecthood to stake a claim in the new system. 
While there was rarely agreement on what rights subjecthood entailed, marginalised peoples 
understood their presence within the imperial system could be leveraged to demand 
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previously unobtainable privileges and fairer treatment. They understood that subjecthood 
consisted of reciprocal bonds of belonging between the sovereign and the subject and were 
keen to leverage this reciprocity to their much needed ends.5  In Jamaica, free people of 
colour lacked many of the rights associated with British subjecthood, including the right to 
own, inherit, and dispose of property and to defend their rights in court or by voting, sitting 
on juries, or serving in representational assemblies.6 Their ability to obtain these rights was 
also coming under increased pressure.7 But the outbreak of the American rebellion 
challenged assumed notions of loyalty among transplanted white Anglo-Protestants.  The 
demands of fighting a global war on multiple fronts increased the threat of invasion and gave 
free men of colour significant leverage as they negotiated subjecthood within the British 
Empire. 
This essay examines how wartime conditions in Jamaica created opportunities for 
dialogue between imperial officials and free people of colour and engaged them in new 
debates on the nature of subjecthood. The importance of military service by free people of 
colour has been identified in previous scholarship, particularly in French and Spanish 
contexts.8 The existence of recruiting broadsides aimed explicitly at free people of colour in 
the British Atlantic World is, however, unique and allows us to investigate in detail the 
language and rhetoric of appeals to and from men in a liminal position between whites and 
enslaved blacks. As free people of colour combined to declare their participation within the 
imperial project as a valuable and distinct set of subjects distinguished from their enslaved 
neighbours, they established themselves as a significant community within Jamaica meriting 
greater thought and consideration from white administrators.  
The American War of Independence advanced this process in ways that have been 
neglected by historians, who have traditionally identified free coloured community cohesion 
as resulting from the French and Haitian revolutions.9 The recruiting advertisements and the 
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petitions did not promise or secure full legal rights of subjecthood but they forced imperial 
officials to recognise the claims of free men of colour and, perhaps more significantly, helped 
establish free men of colour as a constituent community within the British Empire a decade 
before scholars have traditionally identified the beginning of this process. Much as it did in 
other corners and for other communities of the British Atlantic, the American Revolution 
presaged a fundamental change for free men of colour in Jamaica. 
 
Free People of Colour and Revolutionary Jamaica  
Free people of colour had long suffered legal restrictions that prevented them from 
participating in politics and limited their economic and social advancement. Their mixed 
heritage kept them legally distinct from white Jamaicans, from freed people of purely African 
ancestry, and from the enslaved majority. They were denied the franchise and barred from 
holding public office, and, due to restrictions on their employment, many were poor and 
worked as petty artisans, tradesmen, shopkeepers, tavern keepers, sailors, servants, and 
labourers in Kingston, Spanish Town, and the other urban centres of the island.10 A 1733 law 
defined as white those free people of colour who were three generations removed from their 
African ancestor but this would take multiple generations to have an effect.  
The dramatic growth of Jamaica’s free coloured population over the course of the 
eighteenth century heightened elite white concerns about their status at the top of the island’s 
social, economic, and racial hierarchy. Jamaica’s population of free people of colour steadily 
increased from just over 1,000 in 1730 to more than 3,400 by 1762, and 7,065 by 1788, by 
which time they represented three per cent of the Jamaican population and almost one-third 
of the combined free population of people of both European and African descent, though 
enslaved people still outnumbered white by fifteen to one.11 
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Augmenting white Jamaicans’ concerns about the growing free coloured population 
was what this growth signified to Britons about white Jamaicans’ status within the empire. To 
many Britons the promiscuous mingling of whites and blacks against the backdrop of an 
enervating tropical climate and a brutal form of racial slavery combined to render Jamaica 
and other Caribbean islands as less than fully British.12 White colonists in Jamaica responded 
to doubts concerning their Britishness by working to emphasise and protect the whiteness that 
they shared with metropolitan Britons. The island’s ruling elite attempted to equate 
Britishness with whiteness by proscribing the paths that free Jamaicans of colour had 
previously pursued to assume the status and privileges of British subjects.13  
The primary avenue to subjecthood were private privilege bills passed by the 
Assembly which exempted an individual from several and very occasionally all of the legal 
restrictions faced by free people of colour.14 Daniel Livesay has identified roughly 700 such 
bills passed between 1733 and 1826. For the Assembly, bills provided a means of 
augmenting the numbers of settlers with political rights and resulted in a two-tiered 
population of free people of colour: those with special privileges – though usually without 
full rights – and those without.15 Wealthy black and coloured women and their children 
constituted the vast majority of the recipients of such bills – each bill cost as much as three 
slaves to purchase – and they emphasised their education and Christianity and thus how 
different they were from both poor free people of colour and the enslaved.16   
Even the relatively narrow route to subjectood that private privilege bills had offered 
was being foreclosed as an option by the late eighteenth century. An investigation performed 
at the request of the Assembly in 1761 revealed to Jamaican whites that the very small 
number of private privilege bills had helped to consolidate a system wherein free people of 
colour had inherited from white testators real and personal property worth £370,209 in island 
currency. At this point the Assembly moved to limit the amount of money and property that 
 8 
free people of colour might inherit from whites, as well as requiring that they be four rather 
than three generations removed from an African ancestor before being eligible for the rights 
and privileges of British subjects. In the words of Daniel Livesay, ‘the space of toleration in 
which [free people of colour] … operated was dwindling rapidly’. Scholars point to these 
laws as evidence of the rise of ‘a new racial order in Jamaica’ by the mid 1760s.17 
The scope for poorer free men of colour to achieve some recognition of rights had 
been traditionally more limited than that for wealthy women and children and it had revolved 
predominantly around martial service.18 Neither race nor enslavement had proved any 
significant barrier to the arming of free men of colour in the island’s militia, or the temporary 
conscription of a few trusted enslaved men as military auxiliaries. In addition to serving in 
officially organised militia companies, for which they donned uniforms and attended regular 
drills, armed free people of colour served alongside whites and enslaved men in ad hoc units 
that pursued enslaved runaways and rebels in times of crisis.19 In the wake of the wartime 
slave unrest of 1760 that historians know as Tacky’s Revolt the island’s Assembly renewed 
legislation requiring free men of colour to serve in the militia and to protect the island against 
slave rebellions.20 More innovatively, it became commonplace for Jamaica to recruit men of 
African descent for offensive campaigns. At the behest of metropolitan officials, Jamaica had 
furnished Britain’s expeditions against Spain during the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the Seven 
Years’ War with contingents of enslaved pioneers as well as corps of armed free men of 
colour.21 These mid-century wars produced a legacy of increased reliance on recruits of 
African descent to sustain British authority across the Atlantic World.  
Though the British state had made overtures to free men of colour before, the War for 
American Independence significantly altered the relationship between imperial officials, 
Jamaican planters, and free people of colour. The hardships produced by the war, the threat 
of foreign invasion after the entry of France and Spain into the conflict in 1778 and 1779, and 
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the poor relationship between the royal governor and the legislative assembly all combined to 
enhance the military potential of free men of colour. The recruiting proclamations and 
petitions produced during the war rested upon foundations for martial service established at 
mid-century, but they were given meaning by the American War for Independence. 
 The outbreak of the American rebellion was potentially disastrous for Jamaica. As 
Andrew O’Shaughnessy shows, in spite of a petition in favour of the American cause 
presented to George III in 1774, the primary interest of Jamaican planters was the continued 
economic connection with Britain. The war put this at risk. The profitability of sugar 
plantations in Jamaica fell by more than two-thirds during the war.22 Planters were dependent 
upon the Royal Navy and British Army for security against both domestic insurrection and 
foreign invasion, as well as the protection of the shipping necessary for export of the island’s 
produce  and for the supply of foodstuffs essential for the survival of the enslaved 
population.23 But these forces proved unable to defend planters against all that threatened 
them. The discovery in 1776 of a planned slave rebellion in Hanover parish made clear to 
white Jamaicans how vulnerable they were, and resulted in the torture and savage execution 
of suspected ringleaders as well as martial law, redeployment of defensive forces, and a 
temporary embargo on shipping.24  
Environmental factors exacerbated Jamaica’s wartime vulnerability. Hurricanes were 
devastating and could leave the island reliant on food imports.  Such was the case after the 
Hurricane of 1780, which severely damaged the western portion of the island and began a 
cycle of five hurricanes in seven years. Some forty-two per cent of Jamaican estates were 
sold up for debt or taken out of operation between 1772 and 1791, in some measure due to 
the effects of these storms. The 1780 hurricane destabilised the social hierarchy as well as the 
economy. The vestry of Westmoreland stated in a letter to the military that the enslaved had 
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become ‘exceedingly turbulent & daring’ in the knowledge that many whites were dead and 
their magazines destroyed, increasing fears of slave rebellions.25 
The entry of France into the war in 1778 transformed a colonial rebellion into a 
Caribbean and indeed global war. France challenged Britain’s customary naval supremacy in 
the West Indies and the interruption in trade brought some of the British islands to the brink 
of starvation. In the Leeward Islands in particular, severe food shortages, malnutrition and 
disease took the lives of many hundreds of enslaved Africans. Insufficient naval forces and 
regular troops spread far too thinly between the British islands left weakened colonists ill-
defended and vulnerable to attack, a situation illustrated by the French capture of Dominica 
in September of 1778.26 Although Britain captured St. Lucia three months later, the French 
regained the initiative in the middle of 1779 by capturing first St. Vincent and then Grenada, 
the latter the largest British producer of sugar after Jamaica. Spanish entry into the war in 
1779 and then Dutch entry in 1780 broadened the Caribbean conflict still further. By 1781, 
Spanish forces were driving British garrisons from forts along the Gulf Coast, eventually 
taking Pensacola and all of West Florida by the spring of 1781.  
As Britain lost more and more ground the larger British islands appeared increasingly 
imperilled. Jamaica endured three major invasion threats between 1778 and 1782. The first in 
August and September 1778 marked the entry of France into the war but it passed when 
Comte de D’Estaing’s French fleet deployed to North America in a failed effort to re-take 
Georgia, though not before Sir Henry Clinton had sent 4,000 reinforcements to Jamaica from 
New York. The second in August 1779 had been sparked by D’Estaing’s victory at the battle 
of Grenada (6 July) and involved five weeks of martial law that granted the governor 
command over the militia, established military jurisdiction over civil society, confiscated 
property including slaves, and cost as much as £20,000 per week. But these threats palled in 
insignificance to the threat in Spring 1782. The defeat of Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown in 
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October 1781 permitted French Admiral Comte de Grasse to turn his attention to the West 
Indies where he captured St. Kitts in February 1782 before preparing for an invasion of 
Jamaica in April. Defeat in North America had been disastrous, but by early 1782 the British 
faced a situation that was truly unthinkable – the loss of all of their territories in the Greater 
Caribbean.27 
Jamaica’s position was not helped by tensions between the Assembly and the royal 
governor, John Dalling. The defence of Jamaica was the responsibility of the Governor, 
working in conjunction with the island’s Assembly. Dalling served as acting governor of 
Jamaica between 1772 and 1774 before becoming governor in the summer of 1777. Dalling, 
a serving army officer, had been resident on the island since 1762 and was married to 
Elizabeth Pinnock, the daughter of a prominent Jamaican planter, yet his deteriorating 
relationship with the Assembly made it difficult for him to secure funding and manpower for 
the island’s defences.28 The Assembly and Governor Dalling quarrelled over taxes, the 
constitution, the nature and extent of the powers of Councils of War, control of the island’s 
militia, and – most controversially – Dalling’s assault on Nicaragua, which ended in defeat, 
appallingly high casualties, and Dalling’s eventual fall from power.29 
 
Enlisting Free People of Colour 
On Saturday 8 April 1780, a supplement to The Royal Gazette – the source of official 
communiqués on Jamaica – carried a novel and unprecedented advertisement. ‘To the Free 
People of Colour throughout the Island of Jamaica’ was a recruiting advertisement aimed 
solely at free men of colour and is the first known document of its kind in the British Atlantic 
World. It was intended to recruit a regiment for service in Nicaragua which, at that time, was 
making progress up the San Juan River to Lake Nicaragua. The advertisement was published 
almost every week for a three month period between April and July.30 Two thousand copies 
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of the recruiting advertisement were printed as broadsides, although none of these appear to 
have survived.31 
To create this regiment, imperial authorities drew free men into established processes 
of military recruitment, albeit with a racial twist. Having announced to its audience the 
potential for reaping ‘the glory of an EXPEDITION’, the advertisement’s material benefits 
such as clothing, armaments, pay, subsistence, and prize money echoed those offered to white 
volunteers in Jamaica.32 In emphasising the material benefits of military service, the writers 
appealed to a discourse of individual materialism common throughout British recruiting 
proclamations. It served to recognise the agency and interest of free people and situated them 
as human actors with whom dialogue was essential. But its title differentiated these recruits 
as a different class – people of colour – and deserving of the same material benefits as white 
volunteers. 
Indeed, the materials benefits offered to free people were more advantageous than 
those offered to white recruits. The authors appear to have been seeking to learn from past 
difficulties by ensuring adequate material rewards for enlisting. William Henry Lyttelton, a 
former governor, had attributed free Jamaicans’ pronounced lack of interest in serving in the 
1762 expedition against Havana to the fact that ‘most of them have beneficial Trades and find 
a Comfortable maintenance here with their Wives & families’.33 Plans to recruit free people 
of colour in 1779 had initially proposed that since many free men were ‘tradesmen’ they 
should be granted four-month furloughs to continue their trades ‘as an Inducement for 
Inlisting’.34 When the recruiting advertisement appeared in the Spring of 1780, it included a 
£5 enlistment bounty that did not appear in any of the surviving materials related to white 
volunteers.35 Concern with the remuneration offered to free men continued as they were 
deployed to Nicaragua. Officers on the expedition were warned to ‘use them gently, and 
promise after the first service is over that they shall be employed in their own Line … they 
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must be kindly treated for fear that we should not be able to raise more’.36 Officers also 
encouraged the issue of rewards of sugar, coffee, cheese and tobacco, ‘particularly [to] the 
Black People, to exert themselves in carrying on the public Service’.37 
‘To the Free People of Colour throughout the Island of Jamaica’ was part of an 
emerging dialogue between free people of colour and British officials on the island. By 1780, 
free people of colour had already begun to capitalise on white inertia by increasing their 
martial contributions.  While every able-bodied white or free coloured male between the ages 
of fifteen and sixty was required to serve in the militia, the numbers embodied fluctuated 
wildly. Free men of colour constituted a growing proportion of the Jamaican militia: between 
1778 and 1783, the number of white militiamen fell from 6,132 to 5,500 while the number of 
free soldiers of colour rose from 1,478 to around 2,500.38 Increasingly, free men served at 
higher rates than did white men; less than a quarter of the free population, free people of 
colour comprised almost a third of Jamaica’s 7,600-strong militia in 1778.39 Moreover, the 
island’s free soldiers earned a reputation for being steadfast and skilled. One observer 
remarked in 1778 that the Westmoreland militia – which included a newly-formed company 
of ‘Brown infantry’ – was ‘well arm’d & accouter’d and equal in point of Discipline to any 
Regulars on the Island’.40 
Responding to the activities and service of these free men of colour some British 
officials and a few white Jamaicans became convinced of the reliability, the military utility, 
and the overall necessity of Jamaican free soldiers of colour. William Henry Ricketts, a 
planter from Westmoreland, served as Captain of the ‘Brown infantry’ militia unit raised in 
1778. Ricketts petitioned the Assembly in October 1778, commending his militiamen for the 
‘extraordinary alertness of their military manoeuvres’ and suggesting that they be formed into 
a regiment of the British Army ‘and put under British pay, and the discipline of regular 
troops’.41 British officers concurred, suggesting that the island’s coloured militiamen, who by 
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1778 ‘were in general excellent, & only wanted good officers’, were in even better shape by 
1783.42 These men began to think about converting some of these militia companies into a 
provincial army regiment composed solely of free men of colour. Provincial units, unlike the 
militia, consisted of full-time paid soldiers. They were not permanent formations and were 
recruited by short-term enlistments, often of two to five years, but they were disciplined like 
the regulars and, crucially, fell under the Governor’s authority rather than that of the 
Jamaican Assembly. Military officials preferred provincial to militia soldiers both because 
they considered them to be more reliable and because, unlike militiamen, they could be 
deployed off the island.43 
In May 1779, Ricketts and his fellow militia officers William Lewis and Nathaniel 
Beckford secured Dalling’s support for the creation of a regiment of free men of colour, but 
the proposal faced substantial opposition from Jamaica’s planters.44 Significant recruitment 
had already begun when orders arrived from London calling a halt to the plans. The abortive 
Jamaican slave rebellion of 1776, the weakening of plantation slavery in North America, and 
the difficulties Britain faced in defending Jamaica were compounded by Jamaican planters’ 
profound dislike of Dalling, making Jamaican planters and absentees in Britain even more 
wary than usual of the recruitment of free men of colour. The West India lobby and their 
London agent Stephen Fuller argued that planter opposition was ‘unanimous’ and convinced 
Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to call a halt to the project.45 
Fuller couched this opposition in the racialised view that free people of colour were ‘the most 
idle, debauched distempered, profligate Wretches upon Earth’ and ‘little to be depended 
upon’. He concluded that ‘the free Negroes and Mulattoes are not to be trusted in Corps 
composed of themselves alone’, and the racism of Jamaican whites meant that an integrated 
force ‘will not be endured’.46 Germain, aware that the alienation of colonial assemblies had 
already sparked open rebellion in North America, conceded to Fuller’s arguments. 
 15 
This defeat did not last long, however, and Dalling soon rehabilitated the scheme to 
support his Nicaraguan venture, which led to the advertisement in The Royal Gazette.47 
Planter opposition remained strong. White Jamaicans’ opposition to the regiment of free men 
of colour may have been as much about the fear of losing control over the island’s labour as 
it was the product of racial antipathy.48 The loss of free men deprived the island of skilled 
labour while it also appeared to encourage the escape of enslaved men and women who were 
eager to associate themselves with this new military unit. Runaway advertisements in the 
island’s newspapers included reports of enslaved men who had escaped and, perhaps due to 
their own mixed heritage, passed as free men in order to join the expedition. An enslaved boy 
named George King was suspected by his master Jacob De Castro of ‘going on the 
Expedition’. Another, named Jack but passing as free with the name John Tucker, had ‘been 
enlisted in Kingston since he absconded, and carried down to the Musquito-Shore’.49 In the 
minds of white planters, military service provided a new and dangerous means by which 
members of the enslaved labour force could escape their bondage.  But the planters were 
unable to end the policy completely given Germain’s support for Dalling’s expedition. It was 
only the near destruction of the army on the San Juan River and Dalling’s removal from 
office in late 1781 that spelled the end of enlistment. 
Dalling’s replacement was the Lieutenant Governor, Archibald Campbell of Inverneil. 
Campbell proved the inverse of Dalling; whereas Dalling had been an unpopular failure, 
Campbell was an effective and popular military governor.50 He brought with him to Jamaica 
not just a good military record but also more experience than many senior British officers of 
the utility of free coloured and enslaved black people in wartime, including as combatants. 
Campbell had witnessed the contribution that such soldiers had made to the British conquest 
of Guadeloupe during the Seven Years’ War, and he clearly had this precedent in mind at the 
onset of the American War when he penned a long letter to Lord Germain suggesting that by 
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raising a large body of ‘stout active Negroes’ from the sugar islands Britain might quickly 
crush the American rebellion and inspire the desertion of significant numbers of American-
owned slaves.51 
Campbell was far from an opponent of slavery and he saw it as his duty to protect 
Britain’s empire and property, including the enslaved people owned by British subjects. But 
he recognised the significant role that free men, and perhaps even enslaved men might play in 
this conflict. Moreover, Campbell knew all too well how many British soldiers died or were 
incapacitated by diseases following their arrival in the Caribbean, and he was persuaded that 
the deployment of creolised coloured troops ‘will be attended with many advantages to His 
Majesty’s service, by saving the lives of Regulars’.52 As a result of his experience of warfare 
in the West Indies Campbell was one of a number of senior British military officers who 
were prepared to go beyond the recruitment and mobilisation of free coloured militiamen to 
elevating them into the British Army. 
Successful recruitment of colonial soldiers generally required a careful balancing act 
between recruits, military leaders, and local colonial officials. Unlike his predecessor, 
Campbell was able to combine military expertise with political skill and formalise good 
relations with the Assembly and planters. After being sworn in Campbell gave a conciliatory 
speech and he continued to work with, rather than against, the island’s ruling class. He 
ensured that the Assembly passed laws to revive the militia and eradicate their ‘habits of 
Indolence’.53 His approach worked, and Campbell delightedly reported to Lord Germain that 
‘From these marks of Harmony, and the good Temper of the Assembly towards me, I am in 
hopes I shall enjoy ease and Satisfaction in my Government’.54 
 
Free Peoples’ Claims 
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Campbell’s rapprochement with the Assembly was not a panacea and, as the war dragged on, 
the hardships of the war and the threat of invasion only increased.  If 1779 and 1780 had seen 
determined resistance to the idea of regimenting free people of colour outside of the militia, 
the period between October 1780 and April 1782 brought with it devastation in the form of a 
series of massive hurricanes and the 1782 invasion scare as the defeat in North America freed 
up French forces for a descent on Jamaica. Just as free men of colour had capitalised on the 
deadlock between Dalling and the Assembly to increase the value of their martial service, so 
too did they recognise the opportunities for collective bargaining that these dangers entailed. 
Bargaining was all the more crucial in light of the Hurricane of 1780 which left 
thousands dead and ‘the external face of the earth, so much alter’d’. Thomas Thistlewood 
reported that in the west of the island people were staring famine ‘full in the face’.55  The 
disaster was compounded by the uneven distribution of public relief to people of colour. On 
16 April 1782, Campbell presented the Assembly with the petition of ‘the brown infantry, 
and the other people of colour, of the parish of Westmoreland’ which he recommended to the 
attention of the assemblymen. Again it was military service that provided the basis of free 
men’s appeal to island authorities. The petition’s authors vehemently protested the 
‘contemptuous manner, aggravated by insult’ with which they had been treated by officials 
and demanded the respect and support they felt was their due as loyal guardians of the 
island.56 Britain’s Parliament had provided Jamaica with £40,000 to be distributed by local 
officials to those inhabitants who had already faced famine as a result of wartime disruptions 
of trade.57 According to free men of colour, however, Jamaican officials had privileged the 
white population, allegedly declaring that ‘the mulattoes were not to have anything’.58 
Westmoreland’s free militiamen found particularly galling the fact that they were denied 
access to ‘the shoes sent down by his excellency governor Dalling, for the use of those troops 
that were at head-quarters, in 1779’, which they understood to be ‘a present from his most 
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excellent majesty (out of his privy purse) for the militia’. Westmoreland’s ‘Brown infantry’, 
acting as representatives of ‘the other people of colour, of the parish’, appealed directly to 
Campbell for relief from officials’ discourtesy and scorn.59 
The 1782 petitioners made clear that the military service of free men was contingent 
upon fair treatment. They emphasised the ‘zeal and loyalty’ with which they had guarded 
Jamaica from impending invasion, noting their willingness ‘to hazard their lives in defence of 
the island’ and the ‘considerable expense’ they had borne in order to do so. The petitioners 
informed Campbell that they had ‘lost all’ as a result of the hurricane and now found 
themselves ‘destitute of the means to equip themselves with the proper and necessary 
apparel’ of militiamen. They then intimated that without governmental assistance, they would 
be unable to abide by their ‘orders to hold themselves in readiness to march’, which would 
imperil the island just as it faced the threat of invasion from France and Spain. The 
petitioners contended that their martial service ‘should have intitled them to some relief from 
the parliamentary donation’ and warned that without such relief and without the recognition 
that they were deserving of such aid, their military service ‘on which the safety of the island 
depends’ would not be forthcoming.60 
Free people of colour deployed various rhetorical strategies to at once integrate 
themselves with white British subjects and distinguish themselves from them. They 
underscored their devotion to both Jamaica and the British Empire as a whole, proclaiming 
that ‘none exceeds them in loyalty and attachment to his most excellent majesty and 
government’. At the same time, the ‘Brown infantry’ contrasted their honourable and 
steadfast fidelity with the alleged corruption and moral degradation of Jamaica’s white 
officials who had allotted aid to ‘some few favourite women of colour’ but had afforded 
nothing to the men of colour upon whom the security of the island depended.61 The 
petitioners implied that the island’s white commissioners had put their private sexual desires 
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before the public good, thereby undermining Britain’s hold on its most lucrative colony. This 
was an astute appeal to Britons increasingly concerned about the undermining of white 
British identity in the Caribbean through miscegenation, but this time the appeal was made on 
their own behalf by the very products of such liaisons, namely free men of colour. As Brooke 
Newman has demonstrated, Britons believed that white Jamaican men’s sexual relations with 
black and coloured women was ‘a font of contagion responsible for polluting British national 
identity and destabilising its real and symbolic power on the world stage’.62 The 1782 petition 
makes clear that free men of colour were familiar with these concerns and employed them to 
impugn the island’s white elite and to present themselves as suitable replacements for those 
white colonists in whom imperial officials had lost confidence. With their 1782 petition the 
‘Brown infantry’ of Westmoreland claimed that they and the larger community of people of 
colour that they represented were the principled, faithful, and reliable subjects that the British 
Empire so desperately needed to ensure that Jamaica remained British. 
In all of this, the petitioners followed the general format of petitions in this era, 
including assertions of loyalty, an outline of their contributions to the island, and a specific 
set of grievances they expected to be addressed. Claims to subjecthood were primarily made 
through petitioning, which was a crucial right of all non-enslaved subjects regardless of the 
rights to which they were entitled. They operated at two levels: first, as a declaration of 
loyalty in anticipation of future privileges and, second, as a means of establishing co-equal 
status with other subject peoples throughout the empire.63 This was a period in which 
petitioning was ‘omnipresent’ as subjects from Canada and the Caribbean to Minorca and 
South Asia sought to stake a claim in the empire. As Hannah Weiss Muller has demonstrated, 
the inheritance of a vastly expanded territorial empire replete with new and diverse peoples 
after 1763 was met by efforts to expand definitions of subjecthood in ways that challenged 
the ethnic exclusivity of the ‘rights of Englishmen’.64 By appealing for redress in this fashion 
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the free men were implicitly asserting their right to be acknowledged and treated as British 
subjects, echoing similar appeals by myriad subjects spread across the empire. 
This was not the first time free men had petitioned to advance their status in Jamaica 
on the basis of military service. In April 1761, five ‘free mulattoes and negroes’ informed the 
Jamaica Assembly that they had spent four months serving alongside some fifty other free 
coloured soldiers under Captain William Hynes’s command until the ‘negroes, then in 
rebellion . . . were totally reduced and taken’. They bemoaned the fact that their ‘long 
absence . . . from their own private affairs’ had resulted in ‘great loss’, such that they found 
themselves ‘now reduced to the lowest state of poverty’.65 By petitioning Jamaica’s free men 
of colour utilized a common form of political declaration that bound them to the imperial 
project. But in 1761, with slave unrest all but suppressed and unprecedented numbers of 
naval vessels and regular soldiers stationed in the Caribbean, the Jamaican Assembly was 
confident enough to ignore the petition and it came to nothing.66 
By 1782, however, such confidence had evaporated and, as they called upon greater 
demonstrations of martial skill from free people of colour, Jamaica’s officials were forced to 
confront the fact that free people understood the reciprocal nature of loyalty and subjecthood 
and could deploy sophisticated and multilevel petitions into order to advance their rights. The 
claims advanced by the ‘Brown Infantry’ struck a chord with British officials and provided 
them with a weapon to wield as they worked to expand the militarisation of the island’s free 
men. The adjutant general of Jamaica, Alexander Dirom, who was a key ally of Campbell 
and later served under him in India, was sympathetic to the plight of free people and argued 
that ‘Justice, and a due Regard to the Rights of Mankind’ dictated that men who risked their 
lives for their country, to the detriment of their own trades, should be ‘amply’ provided for.67 
With the petition of the ‘Brown Infantry’ in hand, Campbell began to position himself 
for a decisive assault on planter resistance to regimenting free men of colour. At the 
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beginning of March 1782, he requested that the Assembly consider the recruitment of 
enslaved men into the military. Campbell was well aware that the recruitment of slaves would 
be rejected by the Assembly, but by raising this spectre he made recruitment of free men of 
colour appear more palatable. The Assembly rejected Campbell’s proposal that should the 
enemy appear off the coast he be empowered ‘to strengthen our defence by the reception of a 
certain number of Slaves, into actual Service’. ‘[E]mbodying confidential Slaves’, the 
Assembly concluded, was an ‘expedient of too dangerous a nature’, an attitude that may not 
have been helped by the adjutant general’s insistence that enslaved men should be granted 
their freedom in return for their enlistment in the militia.68 The committee appointed by the 
Assembly to consider this issue, however, consisted of William Henry Ricketts, William 
Lewis and Thomas Bourke and, within weeks, Ricketts and Lewis revived their proposal of 
May 1779 to raise two battalions of free soldiers.69 
As white Jamaican planters who themselves depended on enslaved African labour, 
Ricketts and Lewis championed the recruitment of free coloured soldiers into provincial units 
not to weaken but rather to strengthen the defence of Jamaica, slavery, and their own wealth 
and status.70 Ricketts had already commanded the ‘Brown Infantry’ two years earlier, and he 
and Lewis had supported the recruitment of free men for the Nicaragua expedition, so both 
appear to have been more open to free men’s military service than many of the island’s other 
planters. If their proposed battalions were established, both men would receive prestigious 
provincial commissions in the British military, and the status these ranks bestowed, as well as 
potential financial rewards. Ricketts was a member of the Assembly while Lewis was a 
member of the Governor’s Council, and they may have been optimistic that having Campbell 
as their ally in 1782 would ensure their proposals the success they had been denied in 1779. 
Campbell encouraged the Assembly in their consideration of the Ricketts and Lewis 
proposal. When Campbell communicated to the Assembly ‘The Memorial of William Henry 
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Ricketts and William Lewis’ proposing the recruitment of free men of colour into the 
provincials, he adroitly sent along with it a letter from Admiral Sir George Brydges Rodney 
about the delayed arrival of British reinforcements and the fact that enemy invasion forces 
‘seem to be near ready’. But the memorial’s success in 1782 was due to the political 
manoeuvring of free men of colour as well as of Campbell. The memorial of 1782 
emphasised the benefits of staffing battalions with ‘disciplined’ ‘men inured by nature to this 
climate, and having the most intimate knowledge of the woods and defiles of this country’, 
who could secure Jamaica from ‘depredations on the coast’ and stand ‘in readiness’ as ‘the 
fittest body, to quell intestine troubles and the insurrections of slaves’.71 Such arguments no 
doubt resonated with the members of the Assembly, who had only the day before considered 
the Westmoreland petition of the ‘Brown infantry’. 
In April 1782, noting ‘that, at this juncture, the proposition of the memorialists is 
worthy of attention and encouragement’, the Jamaican Assembly approved the establishment 
of a provincial regiment of free soldiers of colour.72 Compared to the Governor’s plan to arm 
their enslaved workforce, the militarisation of the island’s free coloured men in a provincial 
regiment appeared far less dangerous to the planter class, not least because the Assembly 
could maintain some control in the appointment of officers. But it was no less significant for 
that. For the first time in Britain’s New World colonies the elected assembly of a plantation 
colony recommended that the king raise a regiment of coloured troops for the British Army. 
Campbell immediately sent the memorial to Lord Germain and the king with an 
enthusiastic endorsement. He foresaw many advantages to the raising of ‘two Battalions of 
Free Mulattoes and Blacks ... by such respectable Men’.73 Campbell remained convinced that 
the long-term security of the British Caribbean required coloured troops. Even after Admiral 
Rodney’s victory over the French fleet at the Battle of the Saintes had reduced the risk of an 
immediate invasion of Jamaica, Campbell wrote to Baron Welbore Ellis, the newly appointed 
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Secretary of State for the Colonies, resending the Ricketts and Lewis Memorial ‘which has 
received the approbation of the Assembly’ and ‘will be attended by many advantages to His 
Majesty’s service’.74 But it was three months before Campbell received a letter from Home 
Secretary Thomas Townshend noting ‘His Majesty’s pleasure has been signified that You 
should accept the offer made … for raising two Battalions of Free Mulattoes and Blacks’. 
Townshend than added that it was ‘his Majesty’s pleasure that you accept the Offer of a third 
Corps to be raised … on the same footing’.75 
 
The Army’s Appeal 
On 14 November 1782, the recruiting advertisement for one of these new battalions of 
Jamaican troops appeared in The Gazette of Saint Jago de la Vega, and was reprinted in the 
following two issues of the weekly newspaper. Published in Jamaica’s capital by Alexander 
Aikman, the official printer for the Assembly and Governor, the Gazette was at this time the 
island’s most important and widely distributed newspaper. The advertisement quite likely 
appeared in other island newspapers, as well as in thousands of broadsides spread all over the 
island, just like those produced for the 1779-1780 recruiting drive, but these have not 
survived.76 The advertisement was addressed to ‘ALL SPIRITED LIKELY YOUNG LADS 
OF COLOUR’ and sought recruits for the 2nd Battalion of Jamaican Rangers, to be 
commanded by Lewis, and potential recruits were instructed to report to officers in Spanish 
Town, Kingston, Saint Elizabeth, St. Ann and Westmoreland parishes, covering the main 
population areas on the southern side and the central northern coast of the island. The 1st 
Battalion was to be led by Ricketts and it is likely that this unit had its own separate 
recruiting drive, but these advertisements have also not survived. Ricketts and Lewis were to 
be supported by Major Robert Brownrigg, a seasoned British Army officer who had just 
arrived in Jamaica having served with the forces occupying New York City.77 
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At first glance, this appeal to free Jamaican men appears very similar to formulaic 
British recruiting broadsides of the period. It was common for the authors of such appeals to 
flatter potential recruits as fine physical specimens, possessed of honour and a sense of duty 
to king and country. Besides bounties, decent pay and conditions, recruiters promised new 
soldiers and sailors additional rewards following the defeat of Britain’s enemies, and they 
extolled military service as an honourable calling. Thus, when officers of the Royal Navy 
sought to recruit new sailors in Jamaica in late December 1782, their advertisement in the 
Gazette addressed ‘all ABLE BODIED SEAMEN’, hoping that ‘all honest TARS’ would 
avail themselves of the ‘opportunity of meeting success’ in His Majesty’s service.78 A 
recruitment broadside in 1777 addressed Pennsylvania Loyalists as ‘ALL INTREPID ABLE-
BODIED HEROES’ who were willing to serve the king ‘in Defence of their Country, Laws 
and Constitution’. ‘Such spirited Fellows’ who availed themselves of the ‘Opportunity of 
manifesting their Spirit’ by helping quell the American rebellion would ‘be rewarded at the 
End of the War, besides their Laurels, with 50 Acres of Land, where every gallant Hero may 
retire, and enjoy his Bottle and Lass’.79 
While the 1782 recruiting advertisement for Jamaican free men of colour may appear 
similar to standard recruiting broadsides, there were in fact significant differences. This 
attempt to recruit free men must be read in the context of the society in which it appeared, 
where its language, message and the assumptions of authors and readers alike rendered an 
appeal to ‘ALL SPIRITED LIKELY YOUNG LADS OF COLOUR’ unique. British 
recruiting broadsides tended to utilise terms such as ‘able-bodied’, ‘intrepid’ and ‘active 
young Fellows’ to describe potential recruits.80 While the word ‘spirited’ occasionally 
appeared in other British recruiting documents, or in descriptions of the martial qualities of 
British soldiers, the term ‘likely’ was unusual. The appellation ‘likely’ suggested that a 
person appeared vigorous, strong and capable, but it had distinct and racialised connotations 
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in Jamaica that transcended the formulaic suggestions of prowess common to other recruiting 
literature. The word was instantly recognisable to readers of the Gazette and other Jamaican 
newspapers, for it was an adjective commonly employed by whites in their commodification 
of black bodies. Indeed, one of the issues of the Gazette in which the recruitment notice 
appeared featured an advertisement for ‘a likely middling sized young NEGRO’ named 
Robin, while in an earlier issue of the newspaper there appeared notice of Richard, ‘a 
remarkably tall, well-made, likely fellow’ who had escaped from his owner, none other than 
Governor Dalling.81 Readers of the Daily Advertiser in Kingston saw advertised for sale ‘A 
young likely’ enslaved woman together with her five children, as well as an unnamed twenty-
year-old ‘likely Sambo boy’.82 The word ‘likely’ could signify intelligent but was coded in 
such a way as to suggest slyness and a mental acuity that was deemed worthy of note in an 
enslaved person. The term was most often used in Jamaican newspapers to describe as fit and 
healthy black people who either were for sale or who had eloped, in short, people who were 
property. Thus, even the opening appeal of this recruiting document betrayed the 
contradictions inherent in militarising Jamaican men of colour. The implicit racial codings 
embodied in the language of the island objectified potential recruits in terms of the assumed 
characteristics of enslaved Africans, even as this military service enabled free men of colour 
to assert their status as British subjects. 
Another striking difference between this and other recruiting advertisements is the 
relatively muted reference to the king and the comparative lack of references to loyalty to 
Britain and her empire. There was no reference to England or Britain, or to the constitution, 
themes that were common even in the recruiting broadsides aimed at Loyalists in the 
colonies. Instead, the advertisement was framed explicitly in terms of Jamaica, ending with 
the salutation ‘God save the King, and prosperity to the Island of Jamaica’. Loyalty to the 
monarch and to the island was placed on an equal footing. Military service and loyalty were 
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framed as much in local terms as they were in defence of king, empire and constitution, as 
free men of colour were encouraged to distinguish ‘themselves in the Defence of this Island’. 
This may have satisfied free men who wanted to assert their status as free subjects of the 
king, while simultaneously reassuring whites who did not regard free men of colour as being 
fully British with knowledge of, and loyalty to, British society, the constitution, or the values 
they represented.83 It also no doubt reflects the changing circumstances between the 
recruiting proclamations of 1780 and 1782. The focus on Jamaica in 1782 reflected the 
difference between recruiting for a regiment to attack Nicaragua in 1780 and the existential 
threat to Jamaica that the French and Spanish invasion of 1782 posed. 
Localism was essential to recruiting in Jamaica. In the wake of the ill-fated 
Nicaraguan expedition Jamaica’s free people of colour, and the whites who depended upon 
them, were clearly opposed to their deployment off the island, which would have 
significantly reduced the ability of the island to police the enslaved and defend Jamaica 
against slave rebellion. Moreover, many free men of colour were not wealthy, and service off 
the island had been financially ruinous to such people in the past. It was deemed essential that 
recruits to ‘the Battalions of Free People of Colour’ be guaranteed that they were being 
‘raised for the service and defence of Jamaica only, and they will not on any account be taken 
off the island’. The result, however, was that this recruitment advertisement articulated a 
distinctly local and inherently Jamaican form of service in the British Army. 
But localism may also have reflected a perceived political naiveté on the part of free 
people of colour. Recruiting advertisements written for those considered outside of 
conventional understandings of Britishness tended to downplay constitutional arguments in 
favour of material rewards and the individual dignity that came with being a soldier. 
Recruiters tended to neglect the ample evidence available to them that people on the British 
margins understood the political symbolism of an attachment to monarchy in an age of 
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revolution.84 Thus, despite evidence in the Westmoreland petition that free men of colour 
understood the real and symbolic advantages of their ‘attachment to his most excellent 
majesty and government’, the advertisement assumed that arguments emphasising Jamaica 
and material gain – ‘immediate pay, and … every benefit of provisions for themselves and 
families’ – would be more effective than grander claims to British constitutionalism and the 
safety of the wider empire.85 
These advertisements were written as direct appeals to free men of colour; in this, 
they assume that at least some of these men would have been able to read and respond to 
them without the intercession of local whites. To potential recruits the threat of invasion was 
understood less through the frame of Britain, the American War, and empire, and more as 
part of a Caribbean war in which constant combat had led to many islands changing hands, 
and a devastation of the commerce and trade on which the island economies depended.86 Free 
coloured men and their families depended upon commerce as much as whites, and most lived 
in Jamaican towns and cities along the coast. In joining the Rangers recruits could protect 
their families, their homes, and their economic interests, while simultaneously asserting 
loyalty through the time-honoured demonstration of civic identity and belonging by means of 
service in the army. 
Provincial recruits could expect reasonable rates of pay and conditions of service and 
the terms advertised to free men of colour were comparatively good. Surviving recruiting 
broadsides from similar provincial regiments in North America reveal that two years of 
service was common. In 1778, the 1st battalion of Pennsylvania Loyalists were asked to serve 
for ‘only two years, or during the present rebellion in America’, terms of service that were 
replicated for the Buck’s County Light Dragoons in 1778, the King’s American Regiment in 
Georgia in 1781, and the King’s American Dragoons in New York in 1782.87 The longer term 
of five years demanded of the Jamaica Rangers probably reflected a greater sensitivity to 
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Jamaica’s enduring strategic vulnerabilities but the terms were still much better than those 
offered to white recruits of the regular army who enlisted for life. 
The pecuniary benefits – the bounty money offered to encourage recruits – were also 
comparatively appealing.88 The government-regulated bounty for the regular army during the 
American war was £3 sterling, equivalent to thirty days’ paid work for a London labourer or 
several months pay for those labourers outside the capital.89 The necessity of finding good 
quality recruits in North America saw equivalent bounties for provincial forces rise from two 
guineas in 1776 to six guineas by 1781.90 The regulated £5 bounty offered to the Jamaica 
Rangers was, therefore, generally consistent with provincial bounties in North America and 
was higher than that offered to white regulars. The Jamaica Rangers were fully integrated 
into an existing pattern of comparatively generous terms of service for provincial forces. 
Thus ‘ALL SPIRITED LIKELY YOUNG LADS OF COLOUR’ was a contradictory 
document. It was an affirmation of racial hierarchy and white superiority while also 
supporting the  establishment of a regiment that undermined the inequitable treatment of free 
people by the Jamaican Assembly. Though they may have found the racialised coding of the 
recruitment advertisement off-putting, free men clearly found its terms appealing. Both 
Ricketts and Lewis’ battalions soon filled up, as did a third battalion under Nathaniel 
Beckford recruited from formerly enslaved refugees from the Carolinas.91 No muster lists for 
the Jamaica Rangers survive but the battalions were issued a full complement of officers and, 
if the 1st and 2nd battalions equalled the 300 soldiers recruited into Beckford’s battalion, it is 
possible that over a third of the free male population of Jamaica enlisted in the Jamaica 
Volunteers of 1780 or the Jamaica Rangers of 1782, a mobilisation rate unmatched anywhere 
in the British Atlantic World.92  
 
‘Indispensable to the prosperity and security of Jamaica’ 
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‘To the Free People of Colour’, ‘The humble petition of the brown infantry’, and ‘All 
Spirited Likely Young Lads of Colour’ articulated a clear connection between the 
government and its people, including those of colour. Officials were cognisant that the 
security of the empire required continued negotiation with its subjects. These documents 
represented a unique dialogue between mixed race subjects and the imperial state and the 
languages of these sources echo British writings of the period that stressed the perceived 
appeal of monarchical authority in upholding the rights and privileges of the empire’s many 
constituent groups.93 The very creation of these sources was an implicit acknowledgement 
that free men of colour were not only subjects of the crown but a constituency with claims to 
British subjecthood and the rights that this entailed. 
The free men of colour who enlisted appreciated that military service made them vital 
to the imperial state and gave them a means by which they could insist on fairer treatment. 
Free men of colour began to express themselves collectively as essential defenders of the 
island, prompting metropolitan officials to view them as potential allies in the war against 
France and Spain. In the context of impending invasion white Jamaican colonists who had in 
1779 opposed the creation of provincial units staffed by free men of colour were forced to 
accept them in 1782; white Jamaicans relied for both internal and external security on the 
British military and on free people in Jamaica, and these had forged a wartime alliance that 
undermined Jamaican whites’ on-going efforts to equate whiteness with British subjecthood. 
Neither elite white Jamaicans in the Assembly nor imperial officials in London were able 
unilaterally to determine the status of free people of colour in Jamaica. Instead, military 
officials, a few Jamaican planters and politicians, and members of the free community 
themselves engaged in multilateral negotiations concerning the roles that free men would 
play in safeguarding Jamaica. The new level of militarisation of free men of colour 
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introduced a significant variable in the debates over the status of free people in Jamaica that 
would resonate for decades to come. 
That these debates appeared in Jamaica in the context of the War for American 
Independence is significant. Efforts had been made to recruit free people of colour during the 
Seven Years’ War but they were not accompanied by a consideration of the rights of free 
men of colour or an accommodation of their demands. The ascendant desire of white planters 
to associate subjecthood with whiteness in the early 1760s prevented this. But in the charged 
environment of revolutionary Jamaica, where economic and environmental hardship 
combined with the contrasting techniques of two very different governors and the threat of 
foreign invasion, a unique moment occurred. The idea of appealing to free men – and 
listening to and acknowledging their concerns – became essential and stands as a testament to 
the shifting grounds of identity and subjecthood in the British Caribbean. If the Seven Years’ 
War was a ‘moment of experiment’, the American Revolution was a moment of inflection as 
the British military and some white planters were forced to realize that free people of colour 
were a constituency requiring of consideration.94 The result was not simply free men’s 
contribution in the imperial project but their active participation. 
Jamaica’s racial hierarchy survived the American War intact and the service of free 
people of colour did not change the legal rights of free people, the measure by which British 
subjecthood was ultimately judged. Military service did not grant the right to legal 
representation or the right to sit and vote in the legislature. But something had changed. 
Uniquely in British Caribbean history to that point, military officials and planters responded 
collectively to free men of colour in a manner that recognized the latter’s importance and 
worth. The recruiting advertisements of 1780 and 1782, when read in conjunction with the 
Westmoreland petition, make it clear that imperial officials were willing to acknowledge free 
people of colour’s insistence that they be regarded as devoted inhabitants of the island and 
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subjects of the king and that, as such, they be afforded fair treatment. Racial boundaries could 
never be absolute in an environment where the threat of invasion required the mobilisation of 
free people and, with it, the implicit acknowledgement of non-white British subjecthood. The 
racial cohesiveness of white planters frayed as men like Ricketts and Lewis recognized the 
public and private advantages of raising battalions of free people. Those in the Assembly who 
previously had opposed the militarisation of free people were forced to give way as Governor 
Campbell forged an alliance with free men of colour predicated on the military needs of the 
empire rather than the racial imaginings of its elite planters. The authority of white elites was 
thereby challenged in the heart of Britain’s plantation complex. 
More importantly, perhaps, free Jamaicans of colour capitalised upon shifting 
circumstances in Jamaica and the British Empire as a whole and began to coalesce politically 
as a group in the 1780s, a decade before scholars have previously recognised the emergence 
of community mobilisation.95 By emphasizing the central role they played in the island’s 
defence, free men, who had profited less from their relations with whites than had some black 
and coloured women and children, asserted a degree of equality resisted by Jamaica’s white 
plantocracy and affirmed their right to the privileges afforded to loyal male subjects of the 
British Empire.96 In doing so, they laid the groundwork for those who would follow. In 1792, 
the Jamaica Assembly considered another petition, this time from men purporting to speak 
for the island’s free people of colour as a whole.97 Citing their military service, the petitioners 
requested that the Jamaica Assembly remove the legal restrictions that prevented free people 
of colour from enjoying the same liberties as whites in the island. They observed ‘with pain, 
that all Nations and Religions that are denominated White have every benefit of the Laws 
afforded them’, while ‘your Petitioners who are Native inhabitants of the Soil, and in all 
Emergencies call’d forth to its Support and Defence, and who in every respect contribute 
their Aid to the Maintenance of its Government are . . . barr’d and Shut out from those 
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benefits of Citizenship which gratitude unassisted by Philosophy loudly proclaims their Title 
to’.98 Members of the Jamaican Assembly continued to resist requests for equal rights, again 
employing Stephen Fuller to detail planter resistance to this ‘Spirit of Innovation’ to the 
government in London.99 But the free men of colour who had served would continue to build 
on the precedent of the Jamaica Rangers in asserting that military service entitled them to the 
rights of British subjects. 
When the American War ended these free troops remained in the Caribbean. While 
Ricketts’ and Lewis’ battalions were disbanded in 1783, Beckford’s battalion, which had 
been formed of liberated slaves from North America, was sent to Grenada where it provided 
the foundations for the Black Corps of Dragoons, Pioneers, and Artificers or the Carolina 
Corps that existed into the 1790s.100 This corps would eventually be replaced by the West 
India regiments, the first units of army regulars recruited from Africans and their 
descendants. These regiments eventually underscored imperial authority over both the 
recruitment of soldiers of African descent and over the local assemblies that had resisted the 
Africanisation of British military power in the Caribbean.101 But the shifting boundaries of 
race and slavery and the narrowing of the gulf between white and black, often attributed to 
the chaos of the 1790s, had appeared a decade earlier with the Jamaica Rangers. And they 
had appeared in part as a response to the agency of free men of colour themselves, and in the 
context of a war which threatened the very survival of British Jamaica. 
It was as if the descendants of the socially dead who, by definition, were culturally, 
politically and socially alienated, had been brought back to life by demonstrating their 
identity as loyal British subjects through military service.102 As ‘British’ soldiers, these free 
coloured Jamaicans asserted that they had reversed an inherited condition, for themselves and 
their families, and in the process blurred what white Jamaicans had hoped would be rigid 
lines between race and service and between empire and subjecthood. While white Jamaicans 
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continued to resist such encroachments, in the minds of the free men of colour who had 
served in the British army, Jamaican racial hierarchies were shifting. From this point forward, 
free men of colour constantly asserted that their military service demanded white recognition 
of their ‘rights as British subjects’.103 Eventually these arguments bore fruit, so that within a 
few decades even the editor of The Jamaica Journal acknowledged that ‘either as citizens or 
as soldiers, in peace and in war’, the free men of colour’s ‘industry and their valour are 
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